I explore whether directors who resign in dissent from their board are rewarded in the labor market for directors. Using a hand collected sample of 278 boardroom disputes reported in 8-K filings during 1995-2006, I show that firms which have disputes are small, highly levered, have poor profitability, and have boards dominated by management. I find that dissent is not rewarded. For all types of directors across all types of disputes, directors who resign in protest experience a net loss in board seats of 85% over the five year period following the dispute. This means dissenting directors are not able to recover the seat they give up by obtaining additional board seats at other public firms. For these dissenting directors it appears that dissent is its own reward.
I. Introduction
What incentives do directors have to act in the interest of shareholders? Specifically, if a director does not agree with a board that appears to go against shareholders' best interest, is the director rewarded for dissenting? In this paper, I explore this question by examining the future employment of directors who resign from boards in dissent. I measure reward as the net gain (loss) in board seats obtained in other public firms from the day before the resignation to five years after the resignation, and scale this number by all current board seats held at the time of the dispute to obtain a percentage. 1 I find that directors who dissent from a board are not rewarded in the market for external directorships. On average, dissenting directors experience a net loss in board seats of 85% over the next five years. Thus, dissenting directors are not able to fully recover the board seat that they resign from in dispute. This finding is obtained whether the dissenting director is independent or not and whether the board is dysfunctional, has a severe agency problem, or because of differences of opinion. For dissenting directors it appears that dissent is its own reward.
A recent WSJ article highlights the issue of director dissent. In July of 2007, three of the thirteen directors of a small local Tennessee bank resigned from their board in disagreement over recent pay raises for the CEO and several top executives. One of the resigning directors claimed that the pay raises were "crafted to provide excessive and retroactive compensation to executive managers." This disagreement over unwarranted pay raises arose while the bank was experiencing a very successful year. The bank hired an outside compensation consultant who benchmarked the bank against much larger peers and 1 Future versions of this paper will explore alternative measures of reward by focusing on the quality of the future board seats obtained by these dissenting directors. They will include measures of the prominence of the new board seat such as the new firm's size, performance, and governance, measures of changes in the financial remuneration of the directors involved in the dispute events such as director and executive compensation as well as changes in the value of stock holdings held in the dispute firm and obtained at the firm providing the new directorship.
recommended large pay increases. One of the dissenting directors wrote in his resignation letter "I have to question whether we are a board of directors -or a board of directed." 2 Directors have begun to speak out in the boardroom against decisions or actions with which they are in disagreement. In 2004, the SEC passed a new law which requires firms to disclose if a director chose to leave the board or not stand for re-election due to a disagreement with the board. The circumstances and/or resignation letters must be included in the company's 8-K filing. Previously, firms were only required to disclose director departures due to disagreements if the resigning director requested his resignation letter to be made public.
Directors have incentives to enhance their reputations to increase their value in the labor market for outside directors (e.g. Fama and Jensen (1983) ). Directors who resign in disagreement tradeoff current financial compensation against an expected loss in reputation which can lower expected future employment and compensation. Alternatively, the signal in dissent should increase the demand for a director's services by enhancing or protecting their reputation.
My results include the following. First, I show that firms which have disagreement events significant enough to trigger a director resignation have some unique characteristics that likely contribute to the dissension in the boardroom. Firms experiencing director dissent tend to be smaller firms with poor operating performance in the year prior to the dispute event. They also tend to be younger firms with more growth opportunities and are concentrated in certain industries such as business services and the communication industry.
Second, I show that these firms also have specific board and CEO characteristics. They tend to have smaller boards with a large presence of managers and are less likely to have independent committees. The CEOs of these firms are typically younger and newer to the firm. The CEOs also exhibit greater power in the boardroom by being more likely to be a member of the compensation committee and are also the board's Chairman in 50% of the firms. The boards and CEOs also own a large amount of the firm's stock, which gives them significant voting power and a large financial stake in the 2 Thurm, Scott, "How Big Raises Undid an Insular Board, " The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2007. firm. Under these circumstances, power struggles may be more likely, and factions of directors can result in certain members having to leave the board if a consensus cannot be reached.
Third, I show that directors who dissent from the board also tend to be younger and newer members of the board and are less likely to be members of committees. Directors who are also attorneys are less likely to dissent from the board, while directors who work in private equity or venture capital are more likely to dissent. In looking at other forms of corporate leadership outside the firm, dissenting directors are less likely to be current Chairmen of other firms and are more likely to be founders of other firms. Directors with additional board seats outside of the firm are less likely to dissent.
Fourth, I classify dissent into four categories. The first category is the alleged presence of a dysfunctional board. The reasons cited in the resignation letters range from complaints over standard board operations such as lack of dissemination of information from management to directors or among directors, lack of board meetings, lack of discussion of corporate events, or lack of cooperation from management or other directors in carrying out their duties. The second category is alleged agency problems. These include complaints about entrenched managers, unreasonable managerial compensation, or poor corporate governance practices. The third category is differences of opinion. The differences of opinion could be about strategic corporate decisions like mergers and acquisitions, new business or product lines, or sources of finance. The fourth category is miscellaneous, where the reasons for resignation -like differences in religious belief -cannot be categorized in the first three bins.
Fifth, I combine the above finding that certain types of directors are more prone to dispute and the fact that there are different types of dissent and perform a multivariate analysis. I confirm the previous findings -dissenting directors have shorter tenures, have fewer board seats outside of the firm, are more likely to be founders of other companies, are less likely to be in a CEO position at another firm, are more likely to work in private equity or venture capital, and less likely to be attorneys. Further analysis reveals that independent directors, linked directors, and founders are more likely to leave because of dysfunctional boards. Founders of other companies and directors who primarily work in venture capital or private equity are more likely to leave over a disagreement due to agency problems. Attorneys are less likely to leave due to agency problems or differences in opinion on corporate strategy and the future direction of the company.
Sixth, and most importantly, I find that directors who dissent from boards in dispute are not rewarded in the market for external directorships. The average dissenting directors experiences a net loss in board seats of 85% over the next five years. This means that dissenting directors are not able to fully recoup the board seat that they give up in leaving the board with the dispute. This outcome is seen for all types of directors and in all types of disputes.
There is relatively little research examining director turnover.
3 Research has studied director turnover following rare corporate events such as director resignation following bankruptcy or financial distress (Gilson (1990)), acquisitions (Harford (2003)), financial fraud (Fich and Shivdasani (2007)), accounting restatements (Srinivasan (2005)), and CEO turnover (Farrell and Whidbee (2003)). A more recent study by Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) looks at whether or not outside directors resign from boards to either protect their reputation or to avoid a heavier workload when firms experience poor performance or negative events and find some evidence to support this 'dark side' of outside directors'
incentives. My paper differs from this work because I follow the career path of the dissenter after the resignation and consider all types of dissent.
4
The closest paper to mine is that by Agrawal and Chen (2010) . They also look at boardroom disputes that lead to director departures. Their sample consists of 168 dispute episodes over the period 3 A large body of research in corporate governance has studied board composition, board size, committee structure, and director backgrounds (e.g. see Hermalin and Weisbach (1988, 1998) for studies on board composition, Yermack (1996) for a study on board size, and Klein (1998) for a study on committee structures). 4 Other studies have followed the career paths of directors, but have studied different events: the reaction to a change in law regarding the acceptance or rejection of antitakeover provisions for firms (Coles and Hoi (2003) ) or how top executives perform in the external market for directors after their firms cut dividends (Kaplan and Reishus (1990) 1995-2006. 5 My paper, which covers the same period as the Agrawal and Chen (2010) paper, has a larger sample size with 278 dispute episodes. I confirm many of their findings on the types of firms that have dissent and who dissents, and I uncover some new findings such as how the type of director is related to the reason for the dissent. The principal difference between our papers is that I focus on the consequences for the dissenting director whereas their paper focuses on the consequences for the firm.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to examine a unique sample of boardroom disputes to determine how these event-specific disagreements affect the future reputations and opportunities of the dissenting directors. My finding is that dissenting directors are not rewarded in the external market for director services; they are not able to fully recoup the board seat that they lose from resigning from the dispute firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data as well as how the sample was collected. Section III explores the where, who and why of disputes. Section IV, the main section of the paper, analyzes whether dissenters are rewarded. Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. Data Description

A. 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Dispute Events
The sample of director disputes was collected from SEC 8-K filings using the 10-K Wizard covering the period 1994 through 2006. Directors who leave a board over a disagreement often provide the firm with a letter describing their disagreement and final thoughts on the matter. Effective August 23, 2004, the SEC began requiring firms to disclose when a director resigns or refuses to stand for re-election due to a disagreement relating to the company's operations, policies, or practices. The company's disclosure must include 1) the date of resignation or refusal to stand for re-election, 2) any positions held 5 They find that these types of conflicts are more likely to occur in firms where the CEO is also the founder, where the CEO has a shorter tenure, where independent block-holdings are higher, and in firms with larger and less independent boards. They also find that directors involved in the disputes have shorter tenures and are more independent of management. Upon experiencing a dispute event, the stock price of the firm has an average abnormal return of -2.6% over the three-day announcement period [-1, +1] , and the firm experiences poor operating performance and stock price performance in the years around the dispute event. These firms are also more likely to experience a shareholder class action lawsuit, proxy contests, asset divestitures, and stock market delisting after the dispute.
by the director within the company or any board committee membership at the time of the departure, 3) and a brief description of the disagreement that caused the director to leave the firm. If the departing director provides a letter to the company, it too must be included in the disclosure as an exhibit regardless of whether the director wishes for it to be made public. The firm must then provide the director with a copy of the disclosure and give the director an opportunity to provide correspondence stating whether they are in agreement or disagreement with the company's account of the dispute. Any additional correspondence submitted by the director must be added to the original 8-K disclosure as an amendment exhibit within two business days after it is received by the company. The firm has four business days to disclose the director departure in an 8-K filing. Prior to August 2004, firms were not required to disclose whether a director left the board due to a disagreement unless the director requested that the disagreement be disclosed. In these cases, the firm had five business days to report the director resignation or refusal to stand for re-election, and had to include the director's letter of resignation as an exhibit.
Firms file many 8-Ks each year as is required by the SEC to provide a current report of certain material corporate events that shareholders should know about. Due to the substantial number of 8-K filings each year by public firms for many different reasons, the 10-K wizard was used to find the relevant 8-K filings using word search strings. Firms are supposed to file any director resignation letters as an Exhibit 17, but it is often filed under the incorrect heading; so the word search strings are used to find all possible resignation letters. The resulting 10-K wizard search provided several thousand potential director resignations due to disputes. I read each disclosure to determine if it was in fact a director departure due to a disagreement as stated by the company or director. The 10-K wizard allows for text searches back to 1994 up through today.
The resulting sample of disagreements covers the period 1994 through 2006. In all, 278 director dispute events were found over this 13 year period. The dispute events represent 269 unique firms, because 9 firms had two distinct dispute events over this time period. Each dispute clearly states that the director left due to a disagreement over the company's operations, policies, or practices as described by the Final Ruling of the SEC on director disputes. Annual Reports during the fiscal year end just before the dispute took place. Accounting data was collected to reconstruct measures of size, debt, and performance. The market value of equity was collected from the introductory paragraph in the 10-K. The first category includes director resignations due to a disagreement on how the board functions as a governing body. The second category of disputes can be described as those where the director leaves because of agency problems within the firm or corporate improprieties. The third category includes disputes concerning a difference in opinion on the corporate strategy or future direction of the company. All remaining disputes are placed in the fourth category which includes general disagreements on operations, policies, and practices without further information and those reasons not falling into one of the other three categories.
C. Dispute Characteristics
D. Measure of Reward
The data for the number of external board seats held by each director before their service at the current firm, during their service at the dispute firm, and after the dispute event are collected from several different sources. The 10-K wizard was used to search for each director in all SEC filings over the period 1994-2010. Director biographies from proxy statements or 10-Ks were read to determine outside board seat membership in both public and private firms over the working years of each director. Each director's outside board seats were also collected from Boardex. Roughly 45% of the directors in the sample were found in Boardex which provides detailed accounts of directors' board services. Boardex covers many public firms and begins data collection of many larger firms beginning in 2000. Boardex reports directorships held at both public and private firms and the tenure of each appointment. Lastly, Compact
Disclosure was used as a third source of outside directorships held by directors in other public firms during the period 1988-2005.
Three different measures of outside board seats are constructed depending on the time of service on the outside board relative to the dispute event date. The first measure is the sum of all prior public board seats held where service as a director ended before the disagreement event occurred at the current firm. The second measure is the sum of all public board seats held by each director at the time of the disagreement event. The last measure is the sum of all public board seats that were obtained within five years after the dispute event date.
The reward is defined as the sum of all new board seats in other public firms received by each director in the five year period following the disagreement event minus the loss of any current public seats held at the time of the dispute within one year after the disagreement event (including the seat lost at the firm with the dispute if the director dissents). The sum is then scaled by the current number of public seats held at the time of the dispute (including the seat held at the firm with the dispute). A five year period following the disagreement event is used based on the observation by Yermack (2004) that the market for directors' services takes time to assess the monitoring ability of new directors. If a director's reputation after being involved in a dispute were to put into question their ability to be a director at one of their other boards, it is likely that the other outside boards would act fairly quickly in severing their association with that director. Therefore, a one year window was chosen to measure the number of outside board seats that are lost due to a change in director reputation.
III. Disputes -Where, Who, and Why?
A. Are firms which have a director dispute special?
Is there anything special about the type of firm that has a public dispute amongst its board members? Table 2 presents information on the size, performance, industry, and other general characteristics of firms which had a director disagreement leading to at least one director departure.
Compustat firms are used as a benchmark for each firm in the dispute sample in the same year. All performance of these firms likely puts a significant amount of pressure on managers and directors to make some changes in the way the firm is operating, which could lead to differences of opinion that fuel disagreements amongst the board members. It may also be a sign that new leadership is needed to bring new ideas or ways to change the company's direction for the future recovery of operating profits. The fact that these firms are under financial distress contributes to the pressure put on the board of directors in making necessary changes in the firms operations, policies, and practices. It makes sense that in these difficult times directors are more likely to be getting into disagreements over the future direction of the company or placing blame on management or other directors for not looking out for the best interest of shareholders. can also see by classification of directors that firms with director disputes have significantly fewer independent directors and linked directors. This shows that these types of boards may be more controlled by top managers within the firm which may contribute to the escalation of disagreements, especially with outside directors. We can also see that dispute firms are less likely to have independent Audit, Nominating, and Compensation committees. There is also a greater concentration of board ownership in dispute firms which is likely due to the fact that they are so much smaller than S&P 1500 firms. This does provide the board with significantly more voting power and a large financial stake within the firm.
Other firm measures in
B. Are the board and CEOs of firms which have director disputes special?
Also, 20% of the dispute firms have staggered boards which allow for each director to remain on the board for three years before coming up for re-election.
Panel B presents descriptive statistics on CEOs of dispute firms compared to CEOs of S&P 1500 firms. CEOs from dispute firms are 2 years younger on average and 4 years younger at the median compared to CEO's at S&P 1500 firms. This goes along with the fact that CEOs at dispute firms have a much shorter tenure with the firm than the typical company. At the time of the dispute the average CEO has been in their position for 5 years compared to almost 10 years for the average CEO in the control group. The CEO of the dispute firm is more likely to be on the Compensation committee at 8% compared to 1% for the benchmark firms, which means they are more likely to be able to influence the level of their own compensation and highlights the potential for conflict. We also see that they have a much higher fractional ownership of the firm which again is attributable to the size of the firms, but it still provides the CEO with substantial voting power and a large financial stake. Other measures for the dispute sample
show that the CEO is also the chairman of the board in 50% of the firms, and the CEO is also one of the founders of the company in 15% of the cases. Since these are young firms it is not surprising that the founder is still the acting CEO.
The conclusion from Table 3 is that the boards of theses dispute firms as well as the CEOs are quite different from the benchmark group. 6 The boards tend to be smaller, more heavily controlled by managers, have less independent committees, and greater board ownership. Likewise the CEOs are more powerful in that they are more likely to be on the compensation committee, have higher fractional ownership, and in 50% of the cases are also the board's Chairman. The fact that inside directors play such a dominant role on these boards may be contributing to these firms having such strong disagreement events amongst the directors that lead to director departures. 
C. Are dissenting directors special?
D. Are disputes special?
In the sample of 278 disagreement events, the reasons for the dispute cover a wide range of events. To better analyze the disputes and the repercussions of the dispute, the sample is divided into four main categories based on the reason for the dispute and resignation. 
E. What types of directors dissent for what types of reasons?
I now integrate the analysis of sections C and D to answer whether there are special combinations of dissenter types and dissent types. Specifically, do some types of dissenters tend to have certain types of disagreements? Table 6 presents logistic regressions on directors of firms with a dispute event. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the director leaves the board due to the disagreement and 0 if the director remains on the board. Given the different nature of the types of dispute events, I first run a regression on all dispute events, and then I run regressions for each subgroup of dispute reason categories. Only results for the first three types of disputes are presented. To recall, the three categories were: (1) a director left the board due to a disagreement over the inefficiency of the board's processes, (2) agency problems or accusations of corporate wrongdoing, and (3) changes in corporate strategy and future direction of the company.
Panel A of where the dependent variable is the reward for dissent. As discussed before, it is estimated as the net change in the number of new board seats obtained in public firms up to five years after the disagreement event net of any board seats that were held at the time of the disagreement and subsequently lost within one year after the disagreement event (including the seat lost at the firm with the dispute if the director dissents).
IV. Are dissenting directors rewarded?
In all specifications, control variables that may affect the number of outside board seats are used such as director age, independence, other current public directorships, as well as firm controls for operating performance and size. A post SEC rule change indicator is used to control for the change in SEC disclosure requirements after August 2004. 7 Industry dummies and clustered standard errors 8 at the firm level are included where indicated. 7 The analysis was also done by comparing the rewards of dissenting director who left before the change in SEC rules to those of dissenting directors who left after the change in SEC rules but the differences were not significant. Likewise, the analysis was done by comparing the rewards of dissenting directors in cases where only one director left the board due to the dispute compared to cases where multiple directors left the board because of the same dispute and the differences were not significant. 8 Results are similar using White's robust standard errors.
The question being answered is whether dissent, irrespective of who dissents, is rewarded. It shows this for all types of dissenting directors, as well as for the three different categories of dissent. The first row shows that dissenting directors are not rewarded. From the first column we can see that the average director loses 85% of their current board seats in leaving the firm because of the disagreement. This means they are not able to recoup the loss of the seat they give up in dissent by obtaining additional directorships at other firms.
As for the control variables, the signs are as expected. In general, younger and independent directors get more board seats. Directors from firms that are larger and have greater operating performance receive a significantly greater number of new board opportunities.
The conclusion from Table 7 is that dissent is not rewarded on average. It does not answer questions like whether the reward is different for certain types of directors dissenting for certain types of reasons. This is an important issue, because in Table 6 we saw that independent directors, directors with primary occupations in venture capital or private equity and founders of other companies were more likely to leave due to certain types of disputes, whereas current CEOs of other companies, and attorneys were less likely to leave due to certain other types of dispute. These interactions need further analysis to see whether certain types of dissenting directors are rewarded differently for different types of disputes. Table 8 presents the same OLS regressions as Table 7 , but now includes interaction terms for these types of directors. Table 8 focuses on dissenting directors who are also independent, venture capitalists, CEOs of other companies, attorneys, or founders of other companies. In Panel A, I compare the net change in the number of new board seats for independent dissenting directors and independent directors who stay on the board. The coefficient on the interaction for dissenting independent directors (b1) is negative and significant in all columns confirming that this type of dissenting director is not rewarded on average. We can further see that when an independent director dissents due to a dysfunctional board they are able to recoup a small portion of their loss in board seats and experience a loss of only 69.4% compared to independent directors who dissent due to agency problems or due to differences of opinion, who have a loss of 83.2% and 95.6% respectively. The difference between the loss for independent directors who leave due to dysfunctional boards and those who leave due to agency problems just misses statistical significance; however, the difference between the loss of those who leave because of dysfunctional boards and those who leave due to differences in opinion is significant at the 5% level. When testing whether non-independent dissenting directors are rewarded differently from nonindependent remaining directors we see again that dissenting non independent directors experience a net loss in board seats.
In all other panels, we consistently see that dissenting directors of various types are unable to replace the seat they give up at the dispute firm. In Panel B, we see some evidence that venture capitalists who dissent due to dysfunctional boards experience a more severe loss of 110% of board seats relative to venture capitalists who stay; however, when they leave for other reasons they have smaller losses. As board seats are not a major source of income for venture capitalists, the above result should not be exaggerated. In Panel C, CEOs of other companies who dissent do significantly worse than CEOs who stay at the dispute firms; however, when they leave because of dysfunctional boards they only experience a loss of 52% compared to 73% for all dissenting CEOs of other companies. In Panels D and E, Attorneys and Founders of other companies who leave due to agency problems only experience a loss in board seats of 78.4% and 75.9% respectively compared to the average attorney or founder of another company who leave with a loss of 90.4% and 85.5% respectively.
V. Conclusion
This paper studies the nature of director disputes at public firms over the period 1995-2006.
All of the measures together tell us that dispute firms are quite different from the average firm. Dispute firms are smaller, have poorer operating performance, higher leverage, are younger firms, and have significantly different industry concentration than firms in Compustat.
The boards of dispute firms tend to be smaller, more heavily controlled by managers, have less independent committees, and greater board ownership. Likewise the CEOs are more powerful in that they are more likely to be on the compensation committee, have higher fractional ownership, and are also the board's Chairman in 50% of the firms. All of these measures show that the board and CEO of the dispute firms have significant ownership stakes and voting rights. The fact that inside directors play such a dominant role on these boards may be contributing to these firms having such strong disagreement events amongst the directors that lead to director departures.
I also find that newer directors are more likely to leave in disputes especially when the dispute is over a break down in normal board functions or due to differences in opinion. Independent and linked directors are more likely to leave due to dysfunctional board behavior. We see that directors with higher stock ownership are less likely to leave the firm due to agency problems. Directors who are founders of other companies are more likely to dissent as well as directors who are in private equity or venture capital when the disagreement is over agency problems or corporate wrongdoing. Attorneys are less likely to leave because of agency problems or differences in opinion on corporate strategy.
In the five year period after the disagreement event, directors who dissent are not rewarded in the external market for directorships and experience a loss of 85% of their current board seats. This means that directors resigning from boards due to disputes are not able to recover the loss of the seat they give up at the firm with the dispute by receiving additional board seats at other firms in the future. This outcome is seen for all types of directors and in all types of disputes. For these dissenting directors dissent is its own reward. The sample consists of all director departures due to a disagreement on a company's operations, policies, or practices from 1994 to 2006. The director departures are from 8-K filings submitted by the firm which contain the director's letter of resignation or refusal to stand for re-election. There are 278 dispute events over the 13 year period and 269 unique firms with at least one director departure meaning 9 firms had two separate dispute events over the time period. In some cases more than one director resigned because of the same disagreement which is shown in the remaining columns. There were 364 directors that left their boards because of one of the 278 disputes. Are firms which have a dispute special? Table 4 The sample consists of all directors of the firms which had the 278 dispute events leading to at least one director departure. The group is divided into the 364 directors who resigned from their boards or refused to stand for re-election and the 1425 directors who remained on their boards through the dispute. Differences between the means and medians of all variables are tested and pvalues are reported. Panel A reports general director characteristics. Linked directors are non-employee directors with disclosed conflicts of interst such as consulting contracts, family relationships with top management, or significant business relationships with the firm. Panel B reports the current titles or former positions held by Inside Directors of the firms as is reported in their director biographies in the firms' proxy statements. CEO is Chief Executive Officer, COB is Chairman of the Board, and COO is Chief Operating Officer. Panel C reports the directors' commitee memberships at the firm with the dispute. Panel D reports directors' primary occupations outside of the company within the last five years. Panel E reports past and present leadership roles held by directors in other firms such as CEO, Chairman, and Founder positions. Panel F presents directors' public board seats held before the dispute event occured, at the same time as the dispute event, and up to five years after the dispute event. The percentage net gain (loss) in public board seats after the dispute is the number of new seats gained up to five years after the dispute minus the number of seats held during the dispute event that were subsequently lost within one year of the dispute event (including the seat lost at the dispute firm) scaled by all public seats held at the time of the dispute. The samples in the logistic regressions consists of all 1789 directors of the firms which had the 278 dispute events that lead to at least one director departure. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the director resigned from the board or refused to stand for re-election due to a disagreement amongst the board members and a 0 if the director decided to remain on the board. Panel A presents results for All Directors and Panel B present results for only Independent Directors. The regressions are run for the entire group of directors in the first specification and then for each of the three relevant subgroups of directors based on the reason for the dispute and director resignation as described in Table 7 Are dissenting directors rewarded? The sample in the OLS regressions consists of all 1789 directors of the firms which had the 278 dispute events that lead to at least one director departure. OLS regressions are run for the full sample and then for subgroups of directors based on the reason for the disagreement and director resignation as described in Table 5 . The three relevant categories of disagreements include those due to 1) Dysfunctional or inefficient boards of directors, 2) Agency problem or accusations of corporate wrongdoing, and 3) Changes in corporate strategy or the future direction of the company. The dependent variable is the net gain (or loss) in the number of new board seats after the dispute event has occurred. It is constructed to be the sum of new board seats in public firms gained over the five year period after the dispute event minus the sum of board seats held by the director at the time of the dispute that are subsequently lost within one year of the dispute event (including the seat lost at the dispute firm) all divided by the number of current seats held at the time of the dispute (including the seat at the dispute firm). Industry dummies are for one-digit SIC codes. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level where indicated. P-Values are in parenthesis. Table 5 . The three relevant categories of disagreements include those due to 1) dysfunctional or inefficient boards of directors, 2) Agency problem or accusations of corporate wrongdoing, and 3) Changes in corporate strategy or the future direction of the company. The dependent variable is the net gain (or loss) in the number of new board seats after the dispute event has occurred. It is constructed to be the sum of new board seats in public firms gained over the five year period after the dispute event minus the sum of board seats held by the director at the time of the dispute that are subsequently lost within one year of the dispute event (including the seat lost at the dispute firm) all divided by the number of current seats held at the time of the dispute (including the seat at the dispute firm). Industry dummies are for one-digit SIC codes. Coefficient tests are at the bottom of the table to test for differences between respective interaction terms. Standard Errors are clustered at the firm level where indicated. P-Values are in parenthesis. But frankly, to get to the crux of the matter, I have not found an environment in the board room that is very receptive to probing much beyond the materials provided by management (and too often, at least in my experience, materials are not sent to the board ahead of time to allow study prior to board discussion). For obvious reasons I can understand why that environment exists, but in the sense that all parties' interests are fully aligned around long term shareholder value creation, that environment has been a puzzle to me. So in summary, I want to be sure I'm entirely clear regarding the reason for my resignation.
Year
It will undoubtedly be interpreted by many as being driven by the outcome of the Renault-Nissan matter, but that is not the case. Rather, it relates to the board room environmental situation I discussed above.
PharmaFrontiers Corporation, Brian E. Rodriguez, October 26, 2005 (2)
Please consider this letter as my formal notice of resignation as a member of the board of directors of PharmaFrontiers Corporation, effective immediately. As a director of PharmaFrontiers over the last fourteen months, I have observed a number of irregularities, as management appears to pursue its own interests without regard to duties of shareholders, unbridled by the board of directors. In this regard, I share Robert Gow's views and concerns. In addition to Bob's observations, I have on several occasions been excluded from directors' meetings through what appeared to be concerted efforts by management to schedule meetings at times making it impossible for me to attend. Further, I have observed that despite specific instructions and mandates given to management by the board of directors, management appears to be operating on its own agenda, ignoring such mandates and instructions with no ramifications. I believe any outside observer would conclude that the judgment of the company's board of directors has been supplanted by the agenda of the company's officers. I have attempted to reverse this situation, but like Bob Gow, find it impossible to continue under the circumstances.
TransCommunity Financial Corporation, James L. Minter, March 29, 2006 (2)
I have, however, become increasingly amazed and dismayed that my efforts over at least the past year and a half to implement needed changes has only resulted in a "clique" insular group of Board members trying to run a community bank holding company and those directors having limited, if any, experience in community banking. As the Board knows, during my tenure I have been an active, engaged director. I believe a Board should not merely rubber stamp decisions of senior management. At this time, I believe there is little that I can achieve by remaining on the Board to help the Company. My resignation must serve as a catalyst for change at TFC. … The Board (controlled by a chosen few) has become an enabler to entrenched holding company management. Such is not effectively discharging its duties to the shareholders (and stakeholders). …You knew well in advance about the concerns of certain Board members over claims of extensive spending, mismanagement, and informational issues. You never consulted with me about possible corrective action. In accordance with Item 6 of Form 8K and Item 7 of Schedule 14A, I request that you disclose this letter and that you file a copy of this letter as an exhibit to a Company Form 8-K.
VirTra Systems Inc, L. Kelly Jones, April 21, 2006 (3)
As we discussed, I strongly disagree with the strategic decision adopted today by the board. I believe it fails to take advantage of our company's opportunities, and is not the course most likely to maximize value to our shareholders. In light of this decision, I do not believe that I can lead the company in the direction the board has chosen. I am therefore resigning as chief executive officer and from the board of directors, effective immediately.
